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Until the late 1960s, the World Bank presented itself as an institution devoted to sound and 
directly productive project loans. Yet, during its very early years, some discussions 
developed inside the Bank regarding the possibility of issuing different types of loans, 
namely loans which – albeit sound – were aimed at tackling social issues («social loans»), 
or not directly project-related needs for foreign currencies («impact loans»). 
This paper analyzes the housing issue as a good case in point. The analysis reveals that the 
Bank was unwilling to lend for housing programs not because these were not sound – in 
fact, they were – but because they appeared to be too social-biased and not directly linked 
to productive investment projects, such as dams, power stations, and railroads. 
This early decision had a significant impact on the subsequent development of the Bank’s 
view of policy making. In fact, it locked the institution into a particular lending pattern, and 
deprived it of important intellectual resources. It was not until the late 1960s that the Bank 





The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – since 
its beginnings known as the World Bank – was instituted at the 1944 
Bretton Woods Conference with the principal purpose of aiding European 
reconstruction after World War II. The abrupt deterioration of international 
relations, the onset of the Cold War and the concomitant direct intervention 
by the US in European reconstruction with the Marshall Plan, made the 
World Bank loans to European countries redundant – in fact useless – 
principally because of the much greater magnitude of the US commitment: 
while the Bank’s loans in 1947 totalled less than half a million dollars, the 
Marshall Plan brought to Europe around four billions dollars per year 
(Kapur et al. 1997). 
The World Bank thus switched – much earlier than expected – to its 
second mission: promoting the development of backward member countries. 
As the World Bank’s President John McCloy stated at a November 1947 
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meeting of the Bank’s Executive Directors: «I think we are going to be 
driven into a very different field sooner than I thought, into the development 
field»
1. The problem was that there were no experts on development issues 
in the US or in Europe at that time, let alone in more backward countries: 
the lack of interest in such matters on the part of academia, and the virtual 
non-existence of most backward countries in the late 1940s – they were still 
dominions or colonies and had been studied only in respect to the 
metropolitan economies (Meier and Seers 1984) – meant that development 
issues were unknown terrain. 
Throughout 1948 and part of 1949 the Bank almost entirely ceased 
issuing loans, and its personnel and officials undertook an intense 
programme of study and missions to backward member countries in order to 
collect data and information. 
Recollections of those years – also by the Bank’s officials who took part 
in those events (Knapp 1975; Sommers 1989) – give rather cursory 
treatment to this transitional period, concentrating on the result of the 
transition itself: the Bank as an institution devoted to strictly productive 
project loans. 
Yet the transitional period itself is worth analysing. Leonard Rist – at that 
time the head of the Economic Department – pointed out many years later 
that the Bank’s policy «was not formulated. It was formed. It evolved. It 
resulted from events. And it changed with different loans. […] Policy 
formulation have been extremely rare» (Rist 1961, p. 47). It is thus 
interesting to examine the internal debate whereby these policies were 
formed, and to determine whether there were alternative policies which in 
fact lost out in the confrontation. As will become evident, alternative 
policies were explicitly discussed at the Bank, but they were set aside for a 
variety of reasons. The modus operandi which emerged conditioned the 
subsequent behaviour of the Bank. 
Analyzing such a complex issue in its entirety would be beyond the 
scope of this paper. It therefore presents a preliminary survey of some of the 
World Bank’s documents from those years, which testifies to the presence 
of proposals which were not implemented during the long Black 
presidency
2, and explains why this happened. These documents concern the 
“housing issue”. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will discuss the 
Bank’s first encounter with housing and urban development issues. Section 
3 will review the Bank’s internal reflections on these issues and their 
eventual practical outcomes. Section 4 will consider the usefulness of 
focusing on the early years of an institution’s life for understanding of its 
subsequent path of development. Finally, Section 5 will propose some 
concluding remarks. 
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2. The ILO and the Housing Issue at the World Bank 
The idea that the World Bank would offer loans for urban development and 
housing had arisen within the Bank itself – more precisely, as will be shown 
below, within its early missions to backward member countries. But as a 
matter of fact, the institution which first sponsored the issue was not the 
World Bank, but the International Labour Organization. 
ILO’s Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee had met 
for its Second Session in Rome from March 16 to March 25, 1949. On that 
occasion, the Italian employers’ delegate
3 – Mr. Gadola – suggested that the 
ILO investigate the possibility of establishing a completely new institution – 
the International Institute for Building Loans – under the control of the two 
Bretton Woods institutions, IBRD and the IMF. According to a 
subcommittee’s minutes, «the function of the proposed institute would be to 
collect private savings by the issue of bonds in countries where such savings 
exist, with a view to making mortgage loans for housing construction, 
especially for the lower-income groups» (ILO 1949a, p. 9). The main 
purpose of this proposal was to sustain and stabilise employment, firstly by 
stimulating a typical labour-demanding activity, and secondly by promoting 
a better distribution of labour among countries. As regards this latter point, 
it was stressed that the project would favour migration from countries with 
surpluses of population to those with deficits
4 (ILO 1949a, p. 10). 
The Resolution was adopted on 25 March, and the ILO Governing Body 
was invited to contact IBRD (ILO 1949c). This it did one month after 
Eugene R. Black, formerly the Bank’s US Executive Director, had become 
the third IBRD President
5. The matter was thus immediately passed to the 
Bank’s Economic Department for preliminary examination. 
The Economic Department, under the direction of Leonard Rist, 
discussed two separate matters: (i) whether housing could be considered a 
sufficiently “productive” project, as required by the Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement
6, and (ii) whether the Bank could contribute with loans, which 
would principally be in US currency, to projects whose outlays would 
principally be in local currency, hence financing only “indirectly” needed 
foreign currency
7. 
As for the first issue, the answer was quite clear: definitely it would not 
be the case for every country, «but no doubt, there are areas where the 
housing shortage seriously hampers the development of new resources and 
industries, so that financing of new houses would in those areas be directly 
productive even within a narrow understanding of that term»
8. 
As for the second point, the analysis was more complicated, not least 
because it was impossible to understand – at that very preliminary stage of 
communication – what possibilities were being considered by the ILO. The 
Bank focused on three: (i) a new Institute selling bonds which would be 
formally guaranteed by the IBRD, (ii) a new Institute selling bonds, with the 
Bank guaranteeing not the bonds themselves, but the monetary policy of the   4
government hosting the building investment, and (iii) a new Institute, with 
the Bank simply acting as a sponsor without any formal commitment. 
The possibility considered most likely by the Economic Department was 
that the Institute for Building Loans would sell bonds in the private markets 
of capital-exporting countries, under guarantees by the IBRD. In this case, 
the problem would arise that the proceeds were mostly in US currency, 
which was inconsistent with the main needs of housing projects, which 
mostly required local currency. The Economic Department thus assumed 
that this extra US currency would be added to the general foreign currency 
resources of the borrowing country as a supplement «necessary to absorb 
the inflationary pressure created by increased construction activity»
9. 
Alternatively, the possibility was considered that the Bank’s intervention 
had been asked to persuade potential local investors to buy the proposed 
Institute’s bonds in the local market, offering a guarantee by the IBRD 
against losses due to devaluations of the local currency. The underlying idea 
was that the Bank’s direct involvement – that is, its authority and control – 
would «keep the local government in line»
10. 
A less likely possibility considered was that the Bank would participate 
merely by lending its prestige and experience, without any formal 
guarantees on the Institute’s bonds. 
Although these three scenarios – and principally the first of them – were 
at odds with the Bank’s previous loan policy, which had principally 
consisted of directly needed foreign currency for reconstruction programs, 
the possibility of loans for “indirectly” needed foreign currency was 
explicitly envisaged by the Articles of Agreement
11. The Economic 
Department thus advised that the matter should be investigated further, 




3. The World Bank’s Internal Reflections on the Housing Issue 
3.1. Bank’s disengagement 
Contacts between the ILO and the Bank continued for a while, but the 
Institute for Building Loans never came into being. This was partly due to 
conflicts within the ILO itself, principally among country representatives on 
the one side, and the internal technical staff on the other
13. The ILO staff, in 
fact, was highly sceptical that such a huge new institution was feasible, or 
that it could find resources with which to finance housing projects, or that 
the Bank could sponsor it on the basis of the ILO Committee’s resolution. 
 The country representatives, by contrast, expressed the need of many 
governments to cope with reconstruction or social problems, or both, and 
saw a new institution headed by the IBRD as a means to channel resources 
into the housing sector. The “housing shortage” was a widely discussed 
problem, and many proposals for programs or institutions to finance housing 
were put forward at least until the mid-1950s
14.   5
The International Bank, for its part, managed to avoid any commitment 
to housing projects
15. As the Bank’s president Eugene Black explained to 
his ILO counterpart, David Morse, it was a strict rule of the Bank that loans 
in foreign currency should be used only to finance the cost of imported 
goods and services, and they could not be diverted to the financing of local 
expenditures
16. Moreover, a more general rule was that the Bank’s loans 
should be for directly productive purposes. As Richard Demuth – then head 
of the Technical Assistance and Liaison Staff Office – put it: «the first test 
of any project to be financed by the Bank is its productivity», and housing’s 
relation to productivity seemed too remote
17. 
Hence, the Bank granted no loans to finance activities in the fields of 
housing, town planning and building materials. Only two loans concerned, 
among other things, building activities. In the case of a “reconstruction” 
loan made to the Netherlands in 1947, some resources were used to finance 
the importing of materials used for housing. In the Netherlands, in fact, 
replacement of workmen’s houses destroyed during the war «was a step 
necessary for the rehabilitation of Dutch industries essential to the national 
economy»
18. In the case of a loan made in 1952 to improve Iceland’s 
agricultural production, some resources were used for the construction of 
farm buildings (IBRD 1952a). However, since Iceland had to import almost 
all its building materials, this loan was considered consistent with the rule 
that only the foreign exchange requirements of a project could be 
financed
19. With the exception of these two loans, building activities were in 
practice ruled out of consideration by the Bank, except residually, as for 
example in the case of the settling of a construction camp at the site of a 
dam project. 
 
3.2. Internal discussions at the Bank: “impact loans” and “social loans” 
Nevertheless, discussion on the issue had not ceased at the Bank. In fact, it 
concentrated on two different proposals: for so-called “impact loans”, and 
for “social loans”. 
The first internal discussion focused on what the Economic Department 
had already argued regarding the ILO proposal: that  even in the case of 
mainly local currency needs, a hard currency loan (i.e. in dollars) could 
prove useful in tackling balance of payments pressures deriving from local 
expenditures. 
This was what came to be called an “impact loan”: that is, a loan made to 
sustain, not a specific project, but the subsequent (inflationary) impact of 
this project on the entire country’s economy. 
This effect had been fully acknowledged by the Bank’s Fifth Annual 
Report (IBRD 1950). This document discussed at length the possibility that 
local expenditure on labour or on domestically produced equipment could 
give rise to increased demand for imported consumer goods or raw 
materials, or, in the Report’s terms, to «foreign exchange requirements   6
indirectly resulting from expenditures in local currency» (IBRD 1950, p. 
10). In this case, a loan from the Bank would be perfectly legitimate if was 
intended to tide a country over a period of expansion without inflation. 
This analysis was based on ideas arising from the work of Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan – then a member of the Bank’s Economic Department – 
on the loan application submitted by the Italian government to the Bank at 
the end of 1948 for the development of Southern Italy. The Italian 
government, in fact, had the means to undertake an investment program 
whose capital equipment would be provided out of domestic sources, but it 
lacked large reserves of foreign currency. In that situation – Rosenstein-
Rodan predicted – the increased income resulting from the investment 
program would generate increased demand. This would either create 
additional demand for imports or a reduced supply for exports. In both 
cases, the country would be subject to inflationary pressure and would need 
a greater amount of foreign currency. Making this additional foreign 
currency available should be the Bank’s task. The loans would thus «finance 
the  impact of an investment program which the Italian government 
undertakes» (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, p. 14). 
The loan to Italy proved successful, but it was not repeated: «it was 
contrary to many people’s thinking, notably to […] the most conservative 
business thinking in the Bank» (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, p. 13). 
The second discussion, complementary to the first, developed from the 
experience of the first comprehensive survey missions undertaken in 
backward member countries. These missions recognized from first-hand 
observation of the social and economic conditions of the countries visited 
that not only directly productive, but even directly social, interventions were 
indispensable for a sustained process of development. This process would 
change sectoral growth rates, the structures of demand and supply, and the 
growth rates of urban and rural populations, thus placing the social structure 
of countries already facing profound social hardship under great strain. 
The Cuba mission of 1950, for example, recommended that urgent action 
be taken to greatly increase the supply of drinking water to the city of 
Santiago, which was at risk of humanitarian disaster (IBRD 1951). The 
Jamaica mission urged the replacement of almost 30 per cent of the houses 
on the island (IBRD 1952b), while the Nicaragua mission opened its final 
report by declaring that «expenditures to improve sanitation, education and 
public health should, without question, be given first priority [for] the 
development of the Nicaraguan economy» (IBRD 1953, p. 22). 
Particularly interesting for this paper is the rehabilitation program for the 
slums of the city of Barranquilla, Colombia, proposed to IBRD in 1952 by 
the former head of the Bank’s 1949 comprehensive survey mission to that 
country – Lauchlin B. Currie, in 1952 economic advisor to the Colombian 
government.   7
In the case of Barranquilla, the bulk of the program consisted in a 
housing program with two purposes: to upgrade living conditions in the 
Barranquilla area called the “Zona Negra”, «probably the worst slum in 
Colombia»
20, and to stimulate economic growth through an investment 
program in a sector – building – which could expand largely without 
depressive effects
21. 
Lauchlin Currie would propose his “Leading Sector” model only in the 
1970s – significantly proposing building as one such leading sector – but it 
is clear that the mechanism, if not the label, was already operative in the 
Barranquilla housing program. It is thus not anachronistic to quote from 
Currie’s reflections on the building sector in his 1974 paper: 
 
The import component is low. The unskilled labour component is 
relatively high. The need it serves is so compelling that in the United 
States and Canada, despite the high level of incomes, “home operations” 
still capture about 30% of disposable income. The stock of houses is so 
large that a relatively small addition should have little effects on prices 
[…]. It is true that the stock is not so great in a developing country but 
this is more than offset by the high growth rate of urban population and 
the desirability of replacing extensive slum areas. (Currie 1974, p. 7) 
 
Currie was not satisfied by explanations of poverty and the vicious circle 
of poverty in backward countries couched in terms of a general “scarcity” of 
capital, nor by solutions which relied on a general or aggregate growth of 
many sectors such to move the entire economy upward. Rather, he proposed 
removing obstacles to sectors whose demand could be estimated as large but 
latent and which could achieve sustained growth «independently of the 
overall rate of growth of the economy» (Currie 1974, p. 6). These two 
conditions identified a sector which could transmit its own independent 
upward movement to other sectors, thus “leading” the economy through a 
process of sustained growth. 
Moreover, this process could be triggered and driven by addressing social 
items on the development agenda as well, for example dwelling renewal. In 
his Colombian economic advice, Lauchlin Currie was reviving his pre-war 




3.3. The Bank’s rejection  of “impact” and “social” loans 
However, neither the concept of “impact loan”, nor the possibility of 
matching social aims with sound economics, changed the Bank’s position. 
The social prescriptions advanced by the missions to Cuba, Jamaica, and 
Nicaragua were ignored by the Bank, nor did it participate in the 
Barranquilla program. 
This was for three main reasons. The first was that it was necessary to 
convince U.S. investors that the Bank was creditworthy, and that its bonds –   8
its main source of funds – were sound (Oliver 1995). This was an 
exogenous and compelling reason that goes some way towards explaining 
the propensity to manage the institution cautiously. Yet, it is not sufficient 
to explain why possibly sound investments were avoided (housing, for 
example), and more in general why no consideration was made of solutions 
that, within the frame of a general “soundness principle”, could tackle both 
economic and social issues. 
Therefore, one must also consider a second reason, namely that the top 
management of the Bank – the Presidents and their closest staff – came from 
the financial community of Wall Street (Kraske 1996), and it was in the 
culture and in the interests of their social milieu to conceive the Bank as 
strictly a bank: that is, a sound conservative institution whose investments 
should «yield the greatest and quickest increase in output and 
productivity»
23. 
The third reason was that the first development loans proved very 
successful in that they were completely repaid. Hence there was no reason, 
from the point of view of conservative bankers at least, to change policy. 
 
4. How Early Decisions Affect the Future History of an Institution 
This brief historical reconstruction has shown that the World Bank 
concerned itself with the housing problem from very early on in its history. 
It was involved in analysis of the issue conducted externally by the ILO 
Committee, and internally both by the Economic Department, which 
devised a loan pattern that would include housing loans, and by the missions 
to backward countries, which proposed that traditionally bankable loans 
should be linked with social loans. 
However, the Bank did not take up those proposals, and decided to grant 
loans only for directly productive purposes. Since this policy yielded high 
returns, it seems coherent to propose a functionalist explanation for what 
happened: there was a well-defined situation with certain constraints (fund 
raising, for example), and the institution developed a perfectly efficient 
solution for it. 
The paper has provided evidence that this kind of explanation is due to a 
perspective mistake. In actual fact, there was more than one option, and 
none of them was intrinsically in conflict with the others. For reasons that 
were not exclusively economic, the institution opted for one particular 
solution to the exclusion of the others, thus establishing a pattern that would 
be pursued long afterwards. 
These considerations match Mark Granovetter’s thesis that organizational 
forms acquire a particular shape for reasons that are not only rational – 
Granovetter stresses networks – and that their further evolution depends on 
that particular shape (Granovetter 1990). It is for this reason that the 
formative periods of institutions – and by extension the turning points in 
their history – are so important: because it is exactly then that there arises   9
from an uncertain situation a shape that progressively acquires solidity and 
becomes less subject to mutations, influencing the subsequent institutional 
development and thus determining a sort of institutional path dependence – 
in the words of Paul David, the «persisting consequences of some aleatory 
and transient conditions that prevailed early in the history of the process» 
(David 1994, p. 208). 
In the case of the World Bank, the early exclusion of “impact loans” and 
“social loans” from the range of its possible interventions, and strict 
adherence to the features typical of a “bank” with no concession made to 
more flexible patterns of lending, affected the institution’s subsequent 
development and characteristics, eventually preventing it from taking 
further steps in comprehension of the mechanisms and of the many facets of 
the modernization process in developing countries. When, during the 1960s, 
the entire community of development scholars and practitioners began to 
criticise the development creed hitherto followed, the World Bank was 
lagging behind. While, at the beginning of the 1970s, David Morse – still 
head of ILO – spoke of «dethronement of the GNP» (1971, p. 7), referring 
to what was by then the widespread  belief that reliance on economic growth 
alone was not sufficient to achieve real and effective development, and on 
various occasions had even led to unexpected negative results (see for 
example Singer 1965, Seers 1969, ul Haq 1971), a World Bank official had 
to admit that «we [at the Bank] know more about the cost effectiveness of 
alternate production techniques of motor boats than we do of teaching 
reading or delivering prenatal care» (Simmons 1974, p. 50). 
Somewhat paradoxically, the World Bank was paying for having 
precociously found an internal equilibrium, with a rather conservative top 
management which had successfully ruled the Bank as strictly a bank, while 
dissenting opinions were reduced to silence. Lauchlin Currie had been 
economic advisor to the Colombian government since 1950 (Sandilands 
1990); in 1953 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan had gone to MIT, «to the academic 
world, where – in the words of the Bank’s vice-president Robert Garner – 
[…] his talents lie» (Garner 1961, p. 98); and even more significantly the 
Economic Department headed by Leonard Rist had been disbanded in 1952 
(Oliver 1975). In the high management’s opinion, «the Bank was not the 
place for the development of broad economic policies or studies» (Garner 
1961, p. 98). 
As a consequence, when in the late 1960s the development field was 
subjected to broad discussions and renewal, the Bank lacked the faculty to 
participate in this new course of action. It was no accident that McNamara’s 
attempt to give the institution a new direction involved criticism of the 
previous creed – «of course it would be comforting to continue to believe 
that there is no conflict between rapid overall growth and comparable 
improvement in the incomes of the poor. But, unfortunately, in the real 
world in which we live, the evidence suggests that there is» (McNamara   10
1972, p. 219) – and the cooptation and enhancement of a new generation of 
development scholars: in primis Hollis Chenery, and then Mahbub ul Haq, 
Frances Stewart, Paul Streeten, Shahid Burki, Norman Hicks, and others. 
Chenery revived the Bank’s Economic Department, and established 
collaboration between the Bank and the Institute for Development Studies 
of Sussex University, whose analyses were collected in the volume 
Redistribution with Growth (Chenery et al. 1974). The group which 
gathered around Paul Streeten began to work with ILO, importing from it 
the stimulus to study the basic needs approach
24 and proposing its own 
original contributions (see the collected volume Streeten et al. 1981, or the 
various studies, partly included in the 1982 volume, by Hicks 1979; 1982; 
Hicks and Streeten 1979; Burki and ul Haq 1981; Stewart 1985)
25. In the 
meantime, McNamara had further widened the Bank’s agenda by providing 
it with an Urban Projects Department and an Urban Poverty Task Group, 
both headed by Edward Jaycox
26. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The Bank was eventually able to join the frontiers of the development 
debate, at least with some outstanding scholars recruited by McNamara, but 
it must not be forgotten that at the outbreak of the debate, during the 1960s, 
the Bank it was at the rear of it. 
Reflections which, from the housing issue onwards, had developed inside 
the institution between the 1940s and the 1950s, show that from the very 
beginning of its development commitment the Bank could have cultivated a 
broader view on development issues than actually did during the 1950s and 
most of the 1960s. 
Instead, the Bank consciously refused to adopt different perspectives on 
development, or – in the words of its vice-president – to consider «broad 
economic policies or studies». While on the one hand this decision, gave the 
institution strong stability, on the other hand it stripped it of the ability to 
understand the change that had come about in the development field during 
the 1960s. What McNamara tried to do was recover suggestions made very 
early in the life of the Bank, but which had neither been taken up nor – 
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